Markov bargaining games by Cripps, M.W.
Markov Bargaining Games
Martin W. Cripps*
University of Warwick,
Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.
First version September 1993
This version January 1997
Abstract: I consider an alternating oﬀer bargaining game which is played
by a risk neutral buyer and seller, where the value of the good to be traded fol-
lows a Markov process. For these games the existence of a perfect equilibrium
is proved and the set of equilibrium payoﬀs and strategies are characterised.
The main results are: (a) If the buyer is less patient than the seller, then there
will be delays in the players reaching an agreement, the buyer is forced into a
suboptimal consumption policy and the equilibrium is ex-ante ineﬃcient. (b)
If the buyer is more patient than the seller, then there is a unique and eﬃcient
equilibrium where agreement is immediate.
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How does one player bargain with another over the price of a good if the value of the good
follows a stochastic process? In the model below the players have an indivisible good which
they bargain over by making alternating oﬀers. The value of this good evolves through
time, it is determined by a Markov chain and the players observe the value of the good
at the start of each period’s bargaining. The fact that the future value of the good is
random gives a possible beneﬁt to waiting, because the value may grow in the future, but
makes an agent’s decisions more complex.
This problem arises if, for example, the owner of oil reserves is bargaining over their
price with an oil company and the future price of oil follows a stochastic process. Here
there is a cost to delay, because of the players’ rates of time preference, but at the
same time the oil company will not choose to extract the reserves immediately but will
generally wait until the oil price has reached a threshold level. I will show that, if the
oil company is more patient than the seller, then the reserves will be sold immediately
and the oil company chooses when to extract the reserves. In this case there is a unique
equilibrium. Moreover, the bargain between the oil company and the seller is determined
by each player’s ability to delay agreement long enough to upset the oil company’s optimal
extraction strategy. The bargain reached is a natural generalisation of the deterministic
solution of Rubinstein (1982) and the equilibrium is eﬃcient. If the seller is more patient
than the buyer then there can be delays in reaching agreement, because the seller cannot
force the impatient oil company to follow a good extraction policy. As a consequence,
at the equilibrium of the bargaining game the seller will delay the agreement, to force
the company to follow an extraction policy that suits the seller. The oil company then
extracts the oil immediately after a bargain is agreed with the seller. The equilibrium in
this case bears no simple relationship to the Rubinstein (1982) solution and in this case
the equilibrium is not generally eﬃcient.
There are two classes of conclusions we can draw from this model: those relating to
bargaining games, and those relating to the optimal waiting literature. First, there is a
class of complete information bargaining games where delays in reaching agreement do
occur, these delays are sometimes eﬃcient but can impose costs on players. This delay
1does not arise because of any signalling (as in Admati and Perry (1987)), nor does it
occur because of any complex strategic eﬀects (as in Perry and Reny (1993) or in Muthoo
(1990)), but is simply because of the beneﬁt that both players perceive in waiting. Second
t h e r ei sac l a s so fm o d e l sw h e r ei ti so p t i m a lt o wait before exploiting a resource, but where
the observed delay is not in general equivalent to the amount of delay observed in a one
person model.
The paper proceeds in the following way. In Section 2 there is a description of
the stochastic process generating the uncertainty in our model and an outline of the
bargaining game. Section 3 characterises the general solution to the bargaining problem
and establishes the existence of an equilibrium.
2. The Model
The ﬁrst element of the model is a stochastic process, Π, which determines the evolution
of a random sum of money and I will call this variable the “cake”. The process is a
homogeneous Markov chain with countable states N := {1,2,...}.T h ef u n c t i o nf(i)g i v e s
t h es i z eo ft h ec a k ei ns t a t ei ∈ N,t h es t a t ea tt i m et is denoted it. States are ordered
so the largest cake occurs when i = 1 and the cake size monotonically converges to zero
as i increases, that is, 1 = f(1) >f (i) >f (i +1 )≥ 0f o ri ∈ N and limi→∞ f(i)=0 .
The transition probabilities for Π are denoted {πij}i∈N,j∈N,w h e r e
P
j∈N πij =1f o ra l l
i ∈ N and πij ≥ 0 for all ij.F o r e a c h i ∈ N, the probability distribution {πij}j∈N
gives the probability of a transition from state i today to the state j ∈ N in the next
period. For example, if the cake is size f(i)i np e r i o dt, then the expected size next
period is
P
j∈N πijf(j). The matrix which has {πij}j∈N as its ith row is denoted P.
To simplify notation, I denote the ith row of P as the vector Pi. Therefore, Piφ :=
P
j πijφ(j) (respectively PiPφ :=
P
j
P
k πijπjkφ(j)) gives the expected value in one period
(respectively two periods) of the random variable φ : N → < when the current state is i.
A one person optimal stopping problem arises if one individual can eat all of the cake
themselves, but must decide the right moment to eat it. Formally, one can state the
problem as: what is the best time to stop the process {δtf(it)}∞
t=1 (where δ ≤ 1i st h e
player’s discount factor)? A strategy τ(.) which determines when to stop the process as a
2function only of past and current states is called a stopping time. The expected payoﬀ from
adopting the optimal stopping time in state i is the value function: vδ(i): =s u p τ Eiδτf(iτ),
(here the supremum is taken over all stopping times, with the convention that f(i∞)=0
and Ei denotes expectations taken from an initial state i). The optimal strategy (if it
exists) is denoted τ∗. The value function for this problem is uniquely characterised as the
smallest solution to the equation
vδ(i)=m a x { f(i) , δPivδ }, ∀i ∈ N. (1)
That is, if the function h(i)a l s os a t i s ﬁes h(i)=m a x {f(i),δPih} then vδ(i) ≤ h(i) for all
i ∈ N.1 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (1) says that if the optimal strategy is
being played in state i, then the maximum expected payoﬀ is obtained either by eating
today’s cake, or by waiting until next period and then playing the optimal strategy. The
optimal strategy appears to be easy to compute (if vδ(i)=f(i)s t o pa n di fvδ(i) >f (i)
continue), however, such a strategy may not always achieve the payoﬀ vδ(i).2 Below, I
prove a result that ensures the existence of an optimal strategy for the Markov chain Π,
which is described above. The result follows from the special structure of the function
f(.): (a) f(.) is bounded above, (b) the only accumulation point of f(.)i sa tz e r o . 3
Lemma 1 If Π is an irreducible aperiodic Markov chain and δ ≤ 1, then the
stopping time τ∗,d e ﬁn e db yt h eﬁrst time it enters the set G := {i|f(i)=
vδ(i)},s a t i s ﬁes vδ(i)=Eiδτ∗f(iτ∗) on the Markov chain Π.
Proof: See the Appendix.
I now describe a bargaining game where the players bargain over the random cake
described above. The game is played by a seller, “she”, and a buyer, “he”, of a randomly
1In general there are many solutions to (1), for example when δ = 1 the function h(i) = 1 for all i ∈ N
is a solution, so it is essential to choose the smallest solution to (1).
2In general there only exists a strategy yielding a payoﬀ within ²>0o fvδ(i): stop if vδ(i) − ²<f(i)
and if not continue.
3The proposition makes some assumptions on the form of the Markov process Π. A Markov process
is irreducible if it is possible to move from any one state to any other in a ﬁnite number of steps, that
is all states communicate with all other states. An irreducible Markov chain cannot have absorbing
states. Relaxing the assumption of irreducibility will complicate the results, but all the results below will
apply mutatis mutandis to any irreducible component of the Markov chain. A suﬃcient condition for the
Markov chain to be aperiodic is for πii > 0 for all i ∈ N.
3valued asset, once the buyer has obtained the rights to the asset he can consume it
whenever he wishes. Both players have a reservation level of zero. Play proceeds as
follows: In the ﬁrst period both players observe the size of the cake, f(i1) ,a n dt h e nt h e
seller suggests a deal. She proposes a sum of money x1 for which she is willing to transfer
her rights over the process to the buyer. The buyer then accepts or rejects her proposal.
If he accepts, then the bargaining terminates. If he rejects, then the game moves into the
second period where the random variable f(i2) is observed and it is the buyer’s turn to
propose a deal. If this division is accepted then the bargaining ends, if not play continues
to a third period. Play continues with alternating oﬀers until an agreement is reached.
The new feature is that, at the start of period t the players observe a random variable
which is the value of the good in that period, however, if they do not agree today, they
do not know the size of the cake they will bargain over in the next period.
Let 0 < γ ≤ 1 be the seller’s discount factor and let 0 < δ ≤ 1b et h eb u y e r ’ s
discount factor.4 If there is an agreement at time t in state i where the buyer pays xt,
then the seller and buyer’s payoﬀs are respectively (γtxt,δt(vδ(i) − xt)). If the players
bargain forever and never reach an agreement then they both get a payoﬀ of zero. The
buyer’s payoﬀ is, of course, determined by his ability to consume the cake in an optimal
state once agreement is reached. I have assumed that the players are risk neutral so
that the surplus they divide is linear. A pure strategy for each player in the game is a
function mapping the history of the state, oﬀers and rejections to an action today. Let
I := [0,1] be the set of possible oﬀers a player can make and let R := {Y,N} be the set
of responses to these oﬀers, then a complete description of the events in a given period is
an element of H := N ×I ×R.Ah i s t o r yt op e r i o dt is an element of the set Ht−1.T h u s ,
a strategy for the seller is a sequence of functions σ := {σt}∞
t=1 such that: (a) for t odd
σt : Ht−1 × N → I,( b )f o rt even σt : Ht−1 × N × I → R. Similarly, a strategy for the
buyer is a sequence of functions ρ := {ρt}∞
t=1 such that: (a) for t even ρt : Ht−1 ×N → I,
(b) for t odd ρt : Ht−1 ×N ×I → R. The equilibrium concept used throughout is that of
subgame perfect equilibrium.
4It is not necessary for the discount factors to be strictly less than unity, because the stochastic process
Π can make the cake shrink even when δ = γ =1 .
43. Equilibrium in the Bargaining Game
This section presents the main results of the paper. First some general results are given.
The ﬁrst result in this section is a characterisation of the equilibrium payoﬀso ft h e
bargaining game which owes a great deal to the method pioneered in Shaked and Sutton
(1984), then an existence result is established in Proposition 1. The last general result
shows that the players will always agree a bargain in a state i,i ft h e yb o t hb e l i e v et h a t
the expected future value of the good is less than its current value in state i. Then the
two cases, (a) where the buyer is more patient than the seller, and (b) where the seller
is more patient than the buyer, are treated separately. Proposition 3 proves that if the
buyer is more patient than the seller then the game has a unique equilibrium payoﬀ in
each state i. At this equilibrium an agreement is reached in the ﬁrst period. An example
then shows that there can be delay in reaching an agreement if the seller is more patient
than the buyer. The ﬁnal proposition shows that if the seller is more patient, then the
buyer will choose to consume the good immediately agreement is reached, that is, the
timing of agreement in the bargaining determines the buyer’s consumption strategy.
First some additional notation is needed. Deﬁne a(i) (respectively A(i)) to be the
inﬁmum (respectively supremum) of the set of all subgame perfect equilibrium expected
payoﬀs for the seller if she is the proposer and the subgame begins in state i. Similarly,
deﬁne b(i)a n dB(i) to be the bounds on the buyer’s equilibrium payoﬀsw h e nh ei st h e
proposer in a subgame beginning in state i. The structure of the game is stationary, so
these bounds also apply after any history leading to state i.
Lemma 2 If Π is an irreducible aperiodic Markov chain, then
a(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − δPiB,γ
2PiPa}, (2)
A(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − δPib,γ
2PiPA}, (3)
b(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − γPiA,δ
2PiPb}, (4)
B(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − γPia,δ
2PiPB}. (5)
Where a(i) is the smallest solution to (2), A(i) is the smallest solution to
(3), b(i) is the smallest solution to (4), and B(i) is the smallest solution to
(5). That is: if h(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − δPiB,γ2PiPh} then h(i) ≥ a(i) for all
5i ∈ N,i fh(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − δPib,γ2PiPh} then h(i) ≥ A(i) for all i ∈ N,
if h(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − γPiA,δ2PiPh} then h(i) ≥ b(i) for all i ∈ N,a n di f
h(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − γPia,δ2PiPB} then h(i) ≥ B(i) for all i ∈ N.
Proof: See the Appendix.
The lemma above characterises the worst equilibrium payoﬀ and the best equilibrium
payoﬀs of the players. The next proposition proves the existence an equilibrium. Existence
is proved by constructing a Markovian, or stationary, equilibrium where the players use
strategies which depend only on the current state and not on previous events.
Proposition 1 If Π is an irreducible aperiodic Markov chain, then there
exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game.
Proof: See the Appendix.
I now give a general result on the states in which the players are certain to come to
an agreement. The condition used in the proposition below, vδ(i)=vγ(i)=f(i), says
that in state i both of the players agree that it is not worth waiting for the cake to grow
in the future and it is better to eat it now. If in state i even the most patient of the two
players agrees that it is not worth waiting for the cake to grow, then the proposition shows
that the players reach an agreement in this state. This result is therefore the stochastic
equivalent of the result that says agreement is immediate when the cake shrinks.
Proposition 2 If vδ(i)=vγ(i)=f(i) for some state i, then the players
reach an agreement in state i.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This completes the general results. I will now study the case where the buyer is
more patient than the seller. I will show that in this case in each state i the players
have unique equilibrium payoﬀst h a ta r ee ﬃcient. I will also show that these payoﬀsc a n
6be obtained at a Markov perfect equilibrium where the players agree immediately and
the buyer then follows his optimal stopping policy. I will argue that this equilibrium
is the natural extension of the Rubinstein solution to a stochastic environment, where
the players’ bargaining strengths are completely determined by their ability to delay
agreement. Moreover, the form of the solution is identical to Rubinstein (1982), provided
that one interprets the terms γPi and δPi as the seller and buyer’s random discount
factors. These results contrast with what is true when the buyer is less patient than
the seller (γ > δ), in this case the equilibria of the game generally exhibit delays before
the players come to an agreement. Also, I show that the equilibrium when the buyer is
less patient does not implement the buyer’s optimal stopping policy, and that it is not a
simple generalisation of the Rubinstein solution.
The proposition below provides a complete characterisation of the equilibria for a
large class of bargaining games. It shows that, if the seller is less patient than the buyer,
then she will transfer the good immediately to the buyer. This allows him to receive the
full value from the optimal stopping policy. This will also maximise both of the players’
potential surplus, because if the seller is relatively myopic any delay in the transfer of
control will impose costs on both parties (the seller bears a cost because she is forced to
wait for the receipt of the cash and the buyer bears a cost because he fails to follow the
optimal exploitative strategy). The equilibrium is, therefore, eﬃcient.5
Proposition 3 If δ ≥ γ and either: (a) γ < 1,o r( b )γ = δ =1and Π is
is an irreducible process with all states transient, then all states i ∈ N have
unique equilibrium payoﬀs to the two players. This unique equilibrium payoﬀ
can be achieved at a Markov perfect equilibrium where there is no delay in
reaching agreement. If the unique equilibrium payoﬀs to the seller are denoted
α(i) and the buyer’s unique equilibrium payoﬀsa r ed e n o t e dβ(i), then these
functions are determined by the equations
α(i) − γδPiPα = vδ(i) − δPivδ, (6)
β(i) − γδPiPβ = vδ(i) − γPivδ. (7)
5In part (b) of Proposition 3 I allow γ = δ = 1 (so both players are inﬁnitely patient), but the process
Π is transient, which implies that f(it) → 0 almost surely. This case, therefore, arises when the value of
t h ec a k es h r i n k sb e c a u s eo ft h en a t u r eo ft h er a n d o mp r o c e s sr a t h e rt h a nt h ep l a y e r s ’i m p a t i e n c e .
7Proof: See the Appendix.
The solutions (6) and (7) for t h eu n i q u ee q u i l i b r i u mp a y o ﬀs in the game, derived in
the proof above, have a simple interpretation. If the terms (δ2 =)δPi and (δ1 =)γPi are
interpreted as random levels of discounting and vδ(i) is interpreted as the notional size
of the cake in state i, then (6) and (7) are analogous to the solution of the deterministic
bargaining problem. Since, with an abuse of notation, we can write the seller’s payoﬀ in
state i as vδ(i)(1−δ2)/(1−δ1δ2) and the buyer’s payoﬀ in state i as vδ(i)(1−δ1)/(1−δ1δ2).
Therefore, if the buyer is more patient than the seller, the outcome of the bargaining game
is qualitatively equivalent to that in the deterministic case – there is a unique solution
with generalised bargaining strengths. The only diﬀerence is the replacing of the size of
the cake with the optimal stopping policy of the buyer vδ.
Corollary 1 If δ ≥ γ and either (a) γ < 1,o r( b )γ = δ =1and Π is
an irreducible process with all states transient, then the bargaining game has
unique equilibrium payoﬀs and the equilibrium is eﬃcient.
Proof : See the Appendix.
I cannot explicitly solve for the equilibria for when γ > δ, however, it is certain that
the equilibria diﬀer from the solution given above. This can be easily veriﬁed, since the
functions α(i), β(i) calculated in (6) and (7) in general will not satisfy α(i) ≥ δ2PiPα
and β(i) ≥ γ2PiPβ when γ > δ.( O fc o u r s e ,i fγ is suﬃciently close to δ and Π is chosen
suitably, then an identical equilibrium can be found.) A second diﬀerence is that there
will be delays in reaching agreements when γ > δ. This is shown in the following example.
E x a m p l e:D e l a yi na g r e e m e n t sw h e n γ > δ
In this example: (a) the seller is more patient than the buyer (γ > δ), (b) in period
t =1t h ec a k ei ss i z e1 /2( f(i1)=1 /2), (c) in all future periods the cake is unity with
probability one, (f(it)=1f o rt =2 ,3,...). Now consider the proposal made by the seller
in period 1. If she sells the cake today, then the buyer must choose between having a
cake size 1/2 today or waiting and getting δ in a period’s time. (If the buyer is impatient
(δ < 1/2) he will choose to eat the cake today and not wait.) From period 2 onwards
8the cake is size one, so the standard Rubinstein solution applies and, as the buyer is the
proposer in period 2, the players’ payoﬀs at the perfect equilibrium beginning in period
2a r e( γ(1 − δ)/(1 − δγ),(1 − γ)/(1 − δγ)) for the seller and the buyer respectively. If
the buyer rejects the seller’s proposal in the ﬁrst period, then his expected payoﬀ from
the next period is δ(1 − γ)/(1 − δγ), so the highest payoﬀ the seller can get from an
agreement in the ﬁrst period of bargaining is δ − δ(1 − γ)/(1 − δγ)w h e nδ ≥ 1/2a n d
1/2−δ(1 −γ)/(1 −δγ)i fδ < 1/2. However, if the seller waits until period 2 she can get
ap a y o ﬀ of γ2(1 − δ)/(1 − δγ) by accepting the buyer’s proposal in the second period. It
is easy to see that if δ < γ, then the seller prefers to wait until period 2 to trade. (Notice
that, although the cake has a deterministic path in this example, the result will also apply
to stochastic model.)
This example shows that the players do not agree immediately when the buyer is
less patient than the seller. The proposition below extends the example by showing that,
if γ > δ, the bargaining only reaches agreement in states i where f(i)=vδ(i), or where
f(i) <v δ(i) and the seller receives a price of zero. The condition f(i)=vδ(i) implies that
the buyer will choose to consume the cake immediately after the bargaining is ﬁnished,
so there is no delay between trade and consumption. One can interpret this outcome
as the seller delaying agreement to force the buyer to follow a consumption strategy
which suits her objectives. However, the seller will not force the buyer to mimic her
consumption policy completely, because although agreement is reached in states where
the buyer expects the cake to shrink, it is not necessary for the (more patient) seller to
expect the cake to shrink at an agreement (vγ(i)=f(i)). The reason this does not happen
is because the buyer is willing to compensate the seller for an early agreement in states
where she would rather delay, vδ(i)=f(i) <v γ(i).
Proposition 4 If γ > δ, then an agreement in bargaining in state i implies
that either: vδ(i)=f(i),o rvδ(i) >f (i) and the seller’s expected payoﬀ in
state i is zero.
Proof: See the Appendix.
This proposition does not say that vδ(i)=f(i)i sas u ﬃcient condition for agreement,
9s ot h e r em a yb es t a t e sw h e r et h ei m p a t i e n tb u y e rw a n t st oc o n s u m et h ec a k eb u tw h e r e
the seller does not agree. That is, from the buyer’s point of view the bargaining does not
follow an optimal extraction policy (see the above example for an instance of this). The
example below will show that the equilibria need not result in agreement at the seller’s
optimal stopping time, because the buyer is willing to compensate the seller for early
consumption. Thus, when γ > δ, the bargaining game need not result in the cake being
consumed in a state that is optimal for either of the players as individuals.
Example : The seller coming to an early agreement when γ > δ
Suppose that γ > δ and that the cake is size γ in period t = 1, but that in periods
t =2 ,3,... the cake is size unity. Unlike the previous example, suppose that the buyer
makes the ﬁrst oﬀer, so the unique subgame perfect equilibrium in t =2g i v e sp a y o ﬀs
((1−δ)/(1−δγ),δ(1−γ)/(1−δγ)) to the seller and the buyer respectively. Now consider
the buyer’s proposal in the ﬁrst period. If the seller agrees to his proposal, then he obtains
the cake in period 1 and he will not wait until period 2, because the current size of the
cake exceeds its future discounted value to him, γ > δ. The smallest oﬀer that the seller
is willing to accept in period 1 is γ(1−δ)/(1−δγ). The buyer is willing to make such an
oﬀer if his payoﬀ from agreement in period t = 1 exceeds that from waiting until period
t =2 ,t h a ti s ,i fγ −γ(1−δ)/(1−δγ) > δ2(1−γ)/(1−δγ). This is true. Thus, although
the seller’s optimal time to eat the cake is in period 2, she is willing to trade before this
time because the buyer is impatient and willing to reward the seller for earlier agreement.
(The calculations above also go through if the cake in period one is γ−²,f o r² suﬃciently
small, and in this case the seller would strictly prefer to delay eating the cake until period
two.)
4. Conclusion
I have characterised the equilibria of the Markov bargaining games. I have completely
solved for the unique equilibria when δ ≥ γ. I have also described some features of the
equilibria in the remaining cases.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
I will begin by considering the case where δ = 1 and the irreducible chain Π is recurrent.
Assume that G = {1},s ot h a tτ∗ only stops in the maximal state. Since: (a) δ =1 ,( b )
for recurrent chains there is a probability one of hitting the state i =1 ,( c )vδ ≤ 1, we
can deduce that vδ(i)=1=Eiδτ∗f(iτ∗).
Now consider two cases case where Π is transient and δ =1 ,o rw h e r eδ < 1. Since
vδ(i) is bounded, the process vδ(iτ∗∧n) is a uniformly integrable martingale. From the
deﬁnition of a martingale we have
vδ(i)=Eiδ
τ∗∧nvδ(iτ∗∧n)=Eiδ
τ∗
vδ(iτ∗)1(τ∗≤n) + Eiδ
nvδ(in)1(τ∗>n). (8)
Provided I can show that the term Eiδnvδ(in)1(τ∗>n) converges to zero as n →∞I
have established the result, because Eiδτ∗vδ(iτ∗)1(τ∗≤n) converges to Eiδτ∗f(iτ∗)a sn →
11∞.I f δ < 1 this is immediate, because vδ ≤ 1. The remaining case has δ =1a n dΠ
transient. To show that Eiδnvδ(in)1(τ∗>n) converges to zero in this case I will show that
v1(in) → 0a l m o s ts u r e l ya sn →∞ .F i r s t n o t e t h a t f(it) → 0a l m o s ts u r e l yi fΠ is
transient. (By Theorem 4.28 p.102 Kemeny et al (1976), for any ²>0a n da n yi ∈ N
there exists a T such that Pr[ ∃t>Ts.t.i t <i| i0 ] <² ,h e n c ef o ra n y²>0a n dν > 0
there exists a T such that Pr[ ∃t>Ts.t.f(it) > ν | i0 ] <² .) Deﬁne the random variable
zt =s u p m≥t |f(im)|,t h e n{zt}∞
t=0 is a non-increasing sequence converging almost surely to
zero. But now notice that
0 ≤ v1(it) ≤ sups≥t|f(is)| = zt,
and since the right hand side converges almost surely to zero, so too must the left. It
follows that Eiδnvδ(in)1(τ∗>n) converges to zero, by the dominated convergence theorem.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2
Assume that there is an equilibrium such that: (1) After any history where the buyer is
the proposer in state i,h ep r o p o s e st h ep a y o ﬀs( vδ(i) − b(i),b(i) )f o rt h es e l l e ra n dt h e
buyer respectively. (2) When the buyer is responder in state i he only accepts oﬀers that
give him a payoﬀ of at least δPib. Now consider the seller’s optimal response. If she is
the proposer after some history, the buyer will accept any oﬀer that gives him no less
than his continuation payoﬀ, that is, he will accept the oﬀer δPib. If the seller makes this
oﬀer she will receive vδ(i)−δPib. The seller’s problem is to decide when to make an oﬀer
that the buyer is willing to accept, that is, she faces an optimal stopping problem with a
reward function vδ(i) − δPib in state i. The seller is the proposer in alternate periods, so
she must wait two periods before she can stop the process, so (by (1)) her value function
to this optimal stopping problem is described by z the smallest solution to
z(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − δPib,γ
2PiPz}. (9)
By Lemma 1, if the seller oﬀers vδ(j) − z(j) to the buyer, when she is the proposer in
state j, and accepts oﬀers which give her a payoﬀ of at least γPjz in state j, then she
will achieve the payoﬀ z(i) in state i. The largest possible equilibrium payoﬀ to the seller
in state i is vδ(i) − δPib, since the buyer would never accept an oﬀer of less than δPib.
12Thus, z(.)=A(.), where A(i) is the seller’s largest possible equilibrium payoﬀ in state i,
provided the initial assumption on b(.) is correct.
If the seller uses the strategy (deﬁned by z(i)) above, then what is the buyer’s optimal
response? The seller accepts proposals from the buyer if they oﬀer her γPiA in state i,
so the buyer also faces an optimal stopping problem with vδ(i) − γPiA as the reward in
state i. His value function for this problem is u the smallest solution to
u(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − γPiA,δ
2PiPu}. (10)
By Lemma 1, a strategy achieving the payoﬀ u(i) exists. This strategy proposes that the
buyer receives u(i) when he is proposer in state i and accepts oﬀers no worse than δPiu
in state i.B u t , u(i) must be his worst possible equilibrium payoﬀ in state i,b e c a u s e
the seller can never expect to get more than γPiA from future play, hence u(i)=b(i).
T h es t r a t e g i e sa b o v eg i v et h eb u y e rap a y o ﬀ of b(i) as proposer in state i and the seller
ap a y o ﬀ A(i) as proposer in state i and these strategies do form an equilibrium. The
initial assertion is therefore correct. An identical argument will show that there is an
equilibrium that supports the payoﬀs B(i)a n da(i). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1
At a Markov perfect equilibrium the players will play strategies which only depend on
the current state. Let α(i) (respectively β(i)) give the seller’s (respectively buyer’s)
expected equilibrium payoﬀ if she (respectively he) were the proposer at a Markov perfect
equilibrium in state i.L e m m a2s h o w st h a tα(i)a n dβ(i)s a t i s f y
α(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − δPiβ,γ
2PiPα}, (11)
β(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − γPiα,δ
2PiPβ}. (12)
I will prove that there exist two functions α(i), β(i) satisfying (11) and (12). First, deﬁne
two sequences of functions {αn(i)}∞
n=1 and {βn(i)}∞
n=1 recursively. Let β1(i)=0a n dl e t
α1(i) be the smallest function satisfying h(i)=m a x {vδ(i),γPih}.N o wd e ﬁne (αn+1,βn+1)
to be the smallest functions satisfying
α
n+1(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − δPiβ
n,γ
2PiPα
n+1},
β
n+1(i)=m a x {vδ(i) − γPiα
n,δ
2PiPβ
n+1,0}.
13First notice that α1 ≥ α2 and that β1 ≤ β2.A l s o , g i v e n t h a t βn ≥ βn−1 ≥ ... ≥ β1
and αn ≤ αn−1 ≤ ... ≤ α1 the construction ensures that αn+1 ≤ αn and βn+1 ≥ βn.
By induction, therefore, {αn(i)} is a decreasing sequence of functions bounded below by
zero and {βn(i)} is an increasing sequence of functions bounded above by unity. These
sequences converge, by monotone convergence, so there exists limits α and β satisfying
(11) and (12).
I must also describe the strategies at a Markov perfect equilibrium to show that the
functions α(i), β(i), constructed above, are the equilibrium payoﬀs. By (11), α is the
solution to a stopping problem with vδ(i)−δPiβ as the reward in state i, where the seller
can only stop the process in even periods. By Lemma 2, a stopping time exists that gives
the expected payoﬀ α(i) in state i. This stopping time is the optimal strategy for the
seller. A similar strategy can be constructed for the buyer. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2
Suppose the game has reached a state where vδ(i)=vγ(i)=f(i)a n dt h es e l l e rp r o p o s e sa
bargain. Let x(i) be her expected payoﬀ in state i and let y(j) be the function describing
the buyer’s payoﬀ if he rejects her oﬀer and play moves to state j.S u p p o s e t h a t t h e
proposition is false, that is, agreement is not reached in state i and that the players
strictly prefer to delay agreement, δPiy + x(i) >v δ(i).
The sum x(i)+δPiy gives the total of the players’ expected payoﬀsf r o mf u t u r e
play. Let the stopping time τ describe the times when players reach agreement after
state i.I nt h es t a t e sit where the players do agree a bargain their total payoﬀ is vδ(it).
Suppose that both players discounted payoﬀs at the rate δ, then their total expected
payoﬀs( x(i)+δPiy) could be calculated as Ei[δτvδ(iτ)], but instead we can ﬁnd an upper
bound on total expected payoﬀs, x(i)+δPiy ≤ Ei[κτvδ(iτ)], where κ =m a x {δ,γ}.B y
combining the previous inequalities, and using the fact that vδ(i)=vγ(i)=vκ(i)=f(i),
we get
vδ(i) <x (i)+δPiy ≤ Ei[κ
τvδ(iτ)] ≤ vκ(i)=vδ(i),
where Ei[.] denotes an expectation conditional on the initial state of the stochastic process
being i. This is a contradiction, so the players are willing to reach an agreement in state
i. Q.E.D.
14Proof of Proposition 3
By Lemma 2 the bounds on the sets of equilibrium payoﬀss a t i s f y
a(i)+δPiB ≥ vδ(i),A (i)+δPib ≥ vδ(i),
b(i)+γPiA ≥ vδ(i),B (i)+γPia ≥ vδ(i).
Moreover, there is an equilibrium where the seller receives the payoﬀs A(i) (respectively
a(i)) when the buyer receives payoﬀs b(i) (respectively B(i) ) .T h el e f th a n ds i d eo ft h e s e
inequalities gives the sum of the players’ expected payoﬀs in the states in which they
agree. At the equilibrium (a(i),B(i)) in state i the total expected payoﬀ to the players
is B(i)+γPia,i ns t a t e sw h e nt h eb u y e rm a k e sa no ﬀer. This can be estimated by: (1)
Calculating the stopping time τ∗ determined by the states in which the players expect to
reach agreement. (2) Adding the players’ payoﬀs at the states they reach agreement, to
get vδ(iτ∗). (3) Discounting this back at the rate δ. This gives an estimate Ei[δτ∗vδ(iτ∗)].
However, the estimate of total payoﬀs, Ei[δτ∗vδ(iτ∗)], overestimates the seller’s payoﬀs
because δ ≥ γ,t h u s
Ei[δ
τ∗
vδ(iτ∗)] ≥ a(i)+δPiB ≥ vδ(i),E i[δ
τ∗
vδ(iτ∗)] ≥ A(i)+δPib ≥ vδ(i),
Ei[δ
τ∗
vδ(iτ∗)] ≥ b(i)+γPiA ≥ vδ(i),E i[δ
τ∗
vδ(iτ∗)] ≥ B(i)+γPia ≥ vδ(i).
But (1) implies that vδ(i) ≥ Ei[δτ∗vδ(iτ∗)] for all i ∈ N,t h u sw eh a v e
vδ(i)=a(i)+δPiB = A(i)+δPib = b(i)+γPiA = B(i)+γPia.
I ti sp o s s i b l et os o l v et h e s ee q u a t i o n sf o ra(i), A(i), b(i), B(i) by substitution. If this is
done one gets two equations: the one in α(i)i ss a t i s ﬁed by both A(i)a n da(i), the other
in β(i)i ss a t i s ﬁed by b(i)a n dB(i).
α(i) − γδPiPα = vδ(i) − δPivδ, ∀i, (13)
β(i) − γδPiPβ = vδ(i) − γPivδ, ∀i. (14)
If γ < 1, then these can be solved by repeated substitution to give a unique positive
solution, which implies α = a = A and β = b = B.I fγ = δ =1a n dt h eM a r k o vc h a i n
Π is transient, then repeated substitution can also be used because Π2n → 0a sn →∞
15(Kemeny et al (1976) p.107), the sum increases (as vδ −δPivδ ≥ 0) and is bounded above
by vδ, so (by monotone convergence) the repeated substitution converges.
α =
∞ X
n=0
γ
nδ
nP
2n(vδ − δPivδ)
β =
∞ X
n=0
γ
nδ
nP
2n(vδ − γPivδ).
Thus, there is a unique solution to the above equations (a(i)=A(i)a n db(i)=B(i)),
and the game has unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs. This equilibrium is also
Markov perfect.
Agreement in the bargaining is immediate only if no player beneﬁts from delay, that
is if α(i) ≥ γ2PiPα and β(i) ≥ δ2PiPβ.
α(i) − γ
2PiPα ≥ α(i) − γδPiPα = vδ(i) − δPivδ ≥ 0,
β(i) − δ
2PiPβ =( vδ(i) − γPiα) − δ
2PiP(vδ − γPα)
=( vδ(i) − γPiα) − δ
2PiPv δ + γδ
2PiP
2α
=( vδ(i) − γPiα) − δ
2PiPvδ + δPi[α − vδ + δPv δ],
=( vδ(i) − δPivδ)+( δ − γ)Piα ≥ 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1
The equilibrium payoﬀsi nt h i sc a s es a t i s f y :( 1 )α(i)+δPiβ = vδ(i) ≥ vγ(i), (2) β(i)+
γPiα = vδ(i) ≥ vγ(i). This says that the sum of the players’ payoﬀs in state i attains the
maximum payoﬀ that either of them could achieve in the one-person stopping problem.
So, it is impossible to choose a stopping time and an allocation that makes both players
better oﬀ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4
Without loss of generality, suppose that the game is in state i of an equilibrium and that
the seller is proposing an agreement. If the buyer rejects her proposal then the game
moves to state j.L e t y(j) be his expected payoﬀ in state j if the bargain in state i is
16rejected. Also, let z(j) be the seller’s expected payoﬀ if she rejects the buyer’s oﬀer in
state j tomorrow. Then, in equilibrium y(j)+z(j) ≥ vδ(j)f o ra l lj, because otherwise
the buyer could propose a lower price in state j. Thus, if the seller’s oﬀer in state i today
is rejected, her expected payoﬀ is at least γPi(vδ − y) ≤ γPiz. The buyer’s expected
payoﬀ, if he rejects the oﬀer in state i,i sδPiy. If the players agree in state i, then the
sum of their discounted expected future payoﬀs is no greater than their current payoﬀ.
Rearranging this we get
vδ(i) ≥ γPi(vδ − y)+δPiy = δPivδ +( γ − δ)Pi(vδ − y) ≥ δPivδ.
There are two possibilities, if players agree in state i.E i t h e r , vδ(i) > δPivδ in state i,
which implies vδ(i)=f(i) by (1), so the buyer consumest h ec a k ei m m e d i a t e l y . O r ,
vδ(i)=δPivδ,f r o ma b o v e ,t h i si m p l i e sPi(vδ − y) = 0. That is, the seller oﬀers the
buyer a payoﬀ equal to what he gets in the one person stopping problem commencing in
state i and the seller receives nothing. If the seller receives nothing, this equilibrium is
equivalent (in payoﬀ terms) to one where the buyer rejects her oﬀer in state i and waits
until f(it)=vδ(it), then he receives all of the cake and consumes it immediately. Thus,
there is a payoﬀ-equivalent equilibrium where players agree only when f(it)=vδ(it).
Q.E.D.
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